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JUNK SCIENCE - THE LAWYER'S ETHICAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Dick Thornburgh*
The following offers some observations designed to advance the
cause of resolving the dilemma presented to judges and lawyers
alike by the escalating concern over "junk science" in our nation's
courtrooms.
Nowhere has this phenomenon been more starkly, or sadly, de-
scribed than in a recent New York Times review of a television doc-
umentary on women affected by breast cancer:
They are convinced that they were poisoned by their toxic envi-
ronment .... Are crops sprayed with pesticides? Well, then of
course pesticides caused breast cancer. Do we use electricity?
Well, of course electromagnetic fields caused breast cancer.
How about those plastics we use with such abandon? Once
again, the women hear, those plastics contain chemicals that can
cause breast cancer.'
The reviewer described the women interviewed as "far removed
from the universe of scientists and others who make distinctions
between hypotheses and evidence, who believe that speculation is
not proof and that when evidence fails to support a hypothesis, the
hypothesis should be abandoned."2
Broadly speaking, I hold that "junk science" in the courtroom
emanates from testimony by expert witnesses hired not for their
scientific expertise, but for their willingness, for a price, to say
whatever is needed to make the client's case. Put simply, I believe
that it is unethical lawyers who are largely to blame for introduc-
ing, or, in settlement negotiations, threatening to introduce this so-
called "expert" testimony. As one commentator noted, "lawyers
casting about for new theories to use to sue manufacturers of
* Former Attorney General of the United States; Counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lock-
hart LLP. This article is based on an address given at Fordham University School of
Law on Tuesday, October 21, 1997.
1. Gina Kolata, Seeking Something to Blame When Breast Cancer Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at El.
2. Id.
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drugs, medical devices and other products create a limitless de-
mand for junk science." '3
A recent example of this phenomenon was reported on the front
page of the New York Law Journal in September 1997.' Within
days of the withdrawal of weight reduction medications Fen-Phen
and Redux from the market, lawyers across the country were in
court seeking damages and simultaneously placing ads in newspa-
pers in search of plaintiffs.5 By mid-November, at least three na-
tionwide and more than two dozen statewide class action suits, as
well as hundreds of individual cases and a shareholder suit were
pending.6
As the litigation explosion expands in this country, junk science
is producing "junk law" that is pervading our courtrooms. The ulti-
mate victims are America's workers and consumers through the
increased costs, diminished innovation opportunities, and foregone
product availabilities imposed on enterprises engaged in scientific
research and development and product manufacturing.
As pointed out in the recent best-seller, Science on Trial, by Dr.
Marcia Angell, the Executive Editor of the New England Journal
of Medicine, breast implant litigation, threatening the existence of
breast implant manufacturers and other suppliers, is but the most
prominent of the abounding examples of this phenomenon.7 In
1992 the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") imposed a mora-
3. Joseph M. Price & Gretchen Gates Kelly, Junk Science in the Courtroom:
Causes, Effects and Controls, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 395, 396 (1996) [hereinafter Junk
Science].
4. Daniel Wise, Tort, Securities Suits Over Diet Pills Abound - Local Lawyers
Seek Damages, Monitoring, N.Y. L.J. Sept. 29, 1997 at 1.
5. See id.
6. Mark Hansen, Fen-phenomenal Tort Battle Brewing, 84 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at
24. This issue of the ABA Journal also reports on law suits by health care workers
against the latex glove industry. Mark Hansen, Wheeze, Sneeze. . . 'Scalpel, Please':
Health Care Workers Allege Latex Gloves Cause Severe Allergic Reaction, 84 A.B.A.
J., Jan. 1998, at 25. As of mid-November 1996, more than 200 lawsuits relating to
latex allergies had been filed in state and federal court and have been consolidated for
discovery purposes in United States District Court in Philadelphia. See id. The plain-
tiffs, nurses and doctors, allege that they have developed a "severe allergic reaction"
to latex due to continued exposure through use of latex gloves. Id. They further
allege that the latex glove makers were aware that continued exposure would cause
such severe allergies, yet they did nothing to make a safer glove. See id. The latest
research, an epidemiological study conducted by the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics, shows that there is no causal connection between working in the health care
industry and latex sensitivity. Id. The National Center for Health is a federal, nonpar-
tisan agency and the study is the largest epidemiological study on the subject ever
done. See id. This is yet another apparent example of junk science litigation.
7. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 69-89 (1996).
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torium on the sale of silicone gel breast implants and subsequently
restricted the sale and use of the implants. Deluged with lawsuits,
Dow Corning, the implant makers, entered into bankruptcy in
1995. Reliable epidemiological data, however, has since demon-
strated that silicone breast implants do not cause the maladies they
were alleged to cause in the myriad lawsuits brought by women
implanted with them.8 In her book, Dr. Angell argues that the
breast implant litigation has threatened the entire industry of medi-
cal devices, as well as an important area of medical research -
epidemiological studies. 9
The classic example of this phenomenon was the Bendectin liti-
gation.10 Faced with claims that the anti-nausea drug Bendectin
caused defects in fetuses, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals was forced
to withdraw this drug from the market despite the lack of evidence
demonstrating such a causal connection. Indeed, although Bendec-
tin litigation had been pending in the courts for over a decade, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted:
the only review plaintiffs' experts work has received has been by
judges and juries, and the only place their theories and studies
have been published is in the pages of the federal and state re-
porters .... Despite the many years the controversy has been
brewing, no one in the scientific community - except defend-
ant's experts - has deemed these studies worthy of verification,
refutation, or even commentary. It's as if there were a tacit un-
derstanding within the scientific community that what's going on
here is not science at all, but litigation.11
Another recent target of junk science litigation is the contracep-
tive device Norplant. An avalanche of lawsuits has been brought
by many of the same lawyers who engaged the makers of silicone
breast implants. 2 In addition, many of the same medical "experts"
and laboratories that prospered from the breast implant litigation
are assisting these lawyers in bringing suits against the makers of
Norplant.13 Norplant entered the United States market in 1991,
after thirty years of development and testing, and has been used by
8. See id. at 99-103, 110, 195-96; see also Junk Science, supra note 3 at 398.
9. See id. at 84-87.
10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 ( 9 1h Cir. 1995).
12. See Junk Science, supra note 3, at 399; see also Gina Kolata, Litigation: Side
Effect of Contraceptive Norplant, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 4, 1995, at G4.
13. Junk Science, supra note 3, at 399; see also, Gina Kolala, Will Lawyers Kill Off
Norplant, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 3 at 1.
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about one million American women. 14 Approximately 50,000 wo-
men have sued the company's manufacturer, alleging that it failed
adequately to warn users of side effects like headaches, weight
gain, ovarian cysts, and depression. 5 A total of 2800 lawsuits are
now pending in just one federal court in Texas. 16
The Texas Supreme Court was obliged to delay lawsuits that
were set for trial while it ruled on defendant's motion to disqualify
plaintiffs' lawyers for hiring a paralegal who used to work for the
defense and for paying an expert $10,000 to switch sides. 7 Despite
extensive litigation and media coverage, the FDA and physician
groups still insist the product is safe. Sales, nonetheless, have
dropped dramatically - from $141 million in its first full year on
the market to $3.7 million last year.'8
Junk science is made possible in part by so-called "experts" who
will testify to any theory the lawyer wants for a price. A look at
the classified section of any legal publication will produce samples
of a whole industry of "experts" advertising their abilities to pro-
vide a wide range of expert testimony. Many of them get right to
the point, highlighting jury awards or settlement amounts gained as
a result of their testimony. One of the largest expert witness refer-
ral services maintains a list of 24,000 experts in 5500 fields. Their
business is litigation, not science. Their motivation raises serious
questions about the use of expert testimony generally. Are these
experts really seeking to assist the trier of fact, or are they hired
guns aiming at a pre-determined result?
At the turn of the century, Judge Learned Hand was among the
first to raise issues regarding the role of expert testimony, question-
ing an expert's ability to give an unbiased opinion when he is being
liberally paid to defend one side to a dispute.1 9 Judge Hand also
questioned a jury's ability to decipher and resolve conflicting ex-
pert testimony. As he observed, "the whole object of the expert is
to tell the jury, not facts,... but general truths derived from his
specialized experience. But how can the jury judge between two
statements each founded upon an experience admittedly foreign in
kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such
14. Court Delays Trial's Start in Norplant Case, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1997, at 35.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.; see also Naomi Freundlich, Science & Technology: Contraceptives, Bus.
WK., June 16, 1997, at 142.
19. See Billings Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 53-54 (1901).
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a task that the expert is necessary at all."2 No better example of
this quandary is presented than in Daubert, where the defense ex-
pert pointed out that none of the published literature examining a
potential causal relationship between prenatal ingestion of Bendec-
tin and birth defects found the product to cause birth defects. 21 In
response, plaintiffs presented eight experts who concluded that
Bendectin can cause birth defects on the basis of animal studies, in
vitro experiments, chemical structure analysis, and "re-analysis" of
previously published studies.22 How is the ordinary lay juror to
handle these diametrically opposed conclusions?
How, we might better ask, has this challenge been handled by
the courts?
I. Judicial Responses to Expert Testimony
For the most part, judicially-administered evidentiary standards
have been the only means - albeit highly imperfect ones - of
excluding junk science from the courtroom. The standard of ad-
missibility for expert testimony was first formulated over seventy
years ago in Frye v. United States.2 3 Frye was the first case to hold
that scientific evidence should be treated differently from any other
evidence.24 The case involved a criminal matter, where a defend-
ant charged with murder wanted to introduce the use of a new sys-
tolic blood pressure test to show that he was telling the truth.
25
The court excluded the evidence, finding that the expert testimony
was based on a principle not "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs."2 6 The Frye rule, in what has come to be known as the "gen-
eral acceptance" standard, required expert testimony based on
novel scientific evidence to have gained "general acceptance" by a
large scientific group.27
20. Id. at 54.
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583-84 (1993).
22. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583-84.
23. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24. See Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific
Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 942 (1997) [hereinafter Improving Judicial
Gatekeeping].
25. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
26. Id. at 1014.
27. See Nancy S. Farrell, Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence
702: A Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 523, 526-27 (1997) [hereinafter Congressional Action
to Amend Rule 702].
1998] 453
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. 28
Rule 702 governs the admission of expert testimony and, in sharp
contrast to the Frye rule, provided that: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."29 The Rules do not make any specific mention of Frye, and,
in light of their more permissive attitude toward the admission of
evidence generally, courts and scholars alike questioned whether
the strict Frye test still survived.3" Under this new standard, some
courts undertook to consider whether particular expert testimony
was reliable. Others just questioned its relevance. And still others
continued to apply Frye.31 Critics complained that some judges
were imposing "no meaningful check on science in the courtroom"
and were permitting experts "to testify to almost any claim regard-
less of the weight of contrary opinion," thus, increasingly relying
on "junk science. 32
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to resolve some of the issues re-
garding the judicial standard for admission of scientific evidence.33
As noted, the plaintiffs in this case were children who were born
with birth defects and whose mothers had taken the anti-nausea
drug Bendectin during their pregnancies. Plaintiffs sought to admit
scientific evidence to support their claim that the drug caused the
children's birth defects. The district court and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals excluded plaintiffs' expert's testimony because it
did not satisfy the Frye test and granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant manufacturer.34
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the general accept-
ance test in Frye was at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, and had thus been superseded.35 Instead,
the Court explained, Rule 702 required federal trial judges to make
28. See id. at 528.
29. FED. R. EVID. 702.
30. See Congressional Action to Amend Rule 702, supra note 27, at 529-30.
31. See id.; see also Improving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 24, at 944; Con-
gressional Action to Amend Rule 702, supra note 27, at 529-30.
32. Improving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 24, at 944.
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
34. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal.
1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
35. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
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a "preliminary assessment" as to both the reliability and relevance
of the scientific testimony offered.36 To satisfy the reliability prong,
the Court explained that a trial judge must find the subject of the
expert's testimony to be "scientific knowledge." The Court offered
a list of four, non-exhaustive factors or "general observations" for
the trial judge to consider in determining whether the testimony
was reliable scientific knowledge: (1) whether the theory or tech-
nique can be, or has been, tested; (2) whether it has been subjected
to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; and (4) the degree to which the theory or technique is widely
accepted in the scientific community.37
On remand in Daubert, the Ninth Circuit added a further consid-
eration of its own: Was the evidence proffered by experts devel-
oped independent of the litigation, or was it developed solely for
purposes of litigation and therefore potentially biased? 38
Daubert was heralded as the case that would resolve the "junk
science" debate.39 To date, the case has been cited in at least 730
federal cases, 325 state decisions, and over 1000 law review arti-
cles. 4° A quick review of some of these materials, however, makes
it clear that the "junk science" debate, and indeed the application
of the Daubert case itself, is far from settled.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens warned of such diffi-
culties in their concurrence in Daubert.4' They agreed that Frye
had been superseded by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but criticized the majority for providing a list of "general
observations" to further guide district courts.42 Because the Court
was not applying these factors to decide whether any particular evi-
dence was admissible, the concurrence argued that the list would
give little more than "vague and abstract" guidelines to the district
courts.43 They also criticized the way in which the majority re-
quired that trial judges make a preliminary assessment as to
whether scientific evidence is reliable: "Questions arise simply
from reading this part of the Court's opinion, and countless more
36. See id. at 592-93.
37. Id. at 593-94.
38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
39. See Anthony Z. Roisman, Emerging Law: The Expert Witness in Toxic Tort
Litigation, SB52 ALI-ABA 375, 390-91 (1997) [hereinafter Emerging Law]; see also
Jay P. Kesan, A Critical Examination of the Post Daubert Scientific Evidence Land-
scape, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J. 225, 227 (1997) [hereinafter Critical Examination].
40. See Critical Examination, supra note 39, at 227.
41. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598.
42. Id.
43. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
questions will arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its
teaching to particular offers of expert testimony. 44
Finally, the concurrence questioned the extent to which federal
judges would now, under the dictates of Daubert, be faced with
"either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists. 45
II. Review of the Law Under Daubert
Just as the Daubert concurrence predicted, federal courts have
been confronted with seemingly endless questions as they struggle
to determine what evidence is admissible under the rules articu-
lated in Daubert.46
Consider, for example, the question of whether courts should
hold hearings (under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)) as part of
their "preliminary assessment" of the proffered evidence.47 Any
such hearing, as one commentator noted, is really a "win-win" situ-
ation for defendants since extended hearings can drain plaintiffs'
resources and result in plaintiffs' loss of a key expert.48 The Ninth
Circuit has held that district courts are not required to hold such
hearings.49 That Court also requires a party challenging scientific
evidence to make a prima facie case showing that the expert failed
to follow accepted scientific methodology or reasoning before it
will proceed with any kind of Rule 104(a) hearing.50 The Third
Circuit, on the other hand, has created something of a "cottage
44. Id. at 600.
45. Id. at 600-01.
46. See District Judge Takes Issue With Circuit Court's Application of Gatekeeping
Role, Federal Discovery News, Aug. 1997, at 4 (discussing Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr.'s
comments on Daubert at a July ALI-ABA conference) [hereinafter FEDERAL Dis-
COVERY NEws].
47. Federal Rule of Evidence 104 (a) provides:
Questions of admissibility generally: Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privilege.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit upon it, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of conditions.
48. See Emerging Law, supra note 39, at 390-91.
49. See Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995).
50. See Hopkins, 33 F.3d at 1124.
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industry" out of Daubert hearings.5" In one case, for example, a
court in that circuit scheduled most of one month and part of two
other months for the preliminary assessment alone.52
Consider, also, the extent to which judges are indeed becoming
"amateur scientists," as the Daubert concurrence predicted. Dif-
ferent circuits seem to look differently at how deeply they should
probe in determining whether an expert's testimony is admissible
under Daubert.53 Must a court, after Daubert, simply consider the
type of scientific data and methodology used by the expert? Or
must the court go further and inquire into the reliability of specific
data or procedures used by the expert? Must a court now reject
expert testimony if it finds that the data or implementation of the
methodology in that particular instance was unreliable?
The Third Circuit says yes.54 In the Paoli II litigation, where
plaintiffs who lived near a rail yard alleged that they were exposed
to and injured by PCBs55 , the district court engaged in a five-day
hearing and extensive analysis to determine the admissibility of
certain evidence. That court added three criteria in addition to the
four proposed in Daubert and left open the possibility that other
factors could be relevant.5 6 As part of its inquiry, the Third Circuit
considered whether the methodology used was scientific and
whether that methodology was used in an unobjectionable man-
ner.5 7 It excluded some testimony because it determined that cer-
51. See Emerging Law, supra note 39, at 388-89 (discussing In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litigation II, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995) and
subsequent district court holdings in that circuit). The author states that "in effect,
the courts in the Third Circuit now appear to be creating a second trial, complete with
witnesses and cross-examination, and lasting sometimes for weeks, just to decide the
question of whether experts should be allowed to testify at the real trial." Id. at 389.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 394-408.
54. See id.
55. PCBs is an acronym for polychlorinated biphenyls.
56. See In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742 & n.8 (3d Cir.
1994) (ruling that district courts should take into account factors set forth in United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985), in addition to factors set
forth in Daubert), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995). The court advised that factors
deemed important by Daubert and Downing include the following:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the
method has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the tech-
nique's operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted; (6) the rela-
tionship of the technique to methods which have been established to be
reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the
methodology; (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put.
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8.
57. See id. at 777-78.
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tain protocol and quality control techniques had not been
undertaken by the laboratory.58
Other circuits would answer the question differently. The Sec-
ond Circuit, for example, has held that disputes about whether an
expert correctly employed a particular scientific methodology
should be left to the jury. 59 These disputes, and others concerning
the strength of an expert's credentials or the lack of textual author-
ity for an expert's opinion, should (according to the Second Cir-
cuit) be "explored on cross-examination" because those issues go
to the weight or credibility of the expert's testimony, not its admis-
sibility.60 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Daubert as "loosen[ing]
the strictures of Frye and mak[ing] it easier to present legitimate
conflicting views of experts for the jury's consideration." 61
The Supreme Court recently reversed the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision in Joiner v. General Electric Company, resolving a split in the
circuit courts of appeal regarding the appropriate standard of re-
view for expert testimony.62 In Joiner, the Eleventh Circuit over-
ruled a district court's exclusion of expert testimony and restored
plaintiff's claim that his exposure to PCBs and other chemicals
caused or helped to "promote" his lung cancer. (The plaintiff had
been a smoker for eight years, his parents had both been smokers,
and his family had a history of lung cancer.)63 Applying what it
described as "Daubert's lower threshold" and a "particularly strin-
gent" standard of review, the court emphasized the limited nature
of its "gatekeeping role."64 The circuit court explained that the
role of the gatekeeper was only to "guard the jury from considering
as proof pure speculation presented in the guise of legitimate scien-
tifically based expert opinion. It is not intended to turn judges into
jurors or surrogate scientists. ' 65 The court further opined that the
58. See id.
59. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 1043.
61. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 1243, 137 L. Ed. 2d 325, 65 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1997) rev'd, 118 S. Ct.
512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508, 66 U.S.L.W. 4036 (U.S. Ga. Dec. 15, 1997).
62. Six circuits apply a "manifestly erroneous" standard; four circuits apply an
abuse-of-discretion standard; and two circuits apply the "particularly stringent" stan-
dard discussed in Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
See David L. Faigman et al., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-3.5 (1997).
63. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 516 (1997).
64. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529-30.
65. Id. at 530.
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trial court should leave it to the jury "to decide the correctness of
competing expert opinions. 66
The Supreme Court reversed, applying the abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing the trial court's decision and concluding that
the trial court-did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert
testimony.67 The Court ruled that "[t]he [animal] studies were so
dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the District Court to have rejected the ex-
perts' reliance on them. ' 68 The Court also upheld the district
court's conclusion that "the four epidemiological studies on which
respondent relied were not a sufficient basis for the experts'
opinions. "69
Citing Daubert's language that the "focus ... must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they gen-
erate," the respondent argued that the district court erred in focus-
ing on the conclusions of the experts rather than the
methodology.70 The Court in Daubert, however, did not provide
much guidance regarding the distinction to be made between meth-
odology and conclusion. In Joiner, the Court stated,
But conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from ex-
isting data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules
of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.71
In other words, trial courts may focus on the conclusions of the
experts in determining whether the data actually supports the con-
clusion. Thus, the ambiguity in Daubert, which on the one hand
stressed the gatekeeping role of the trial judge, and on the other
hand the "liberal thrust" of the evidentiary rules and the call for
juries to resolve evidentiary disputes,7 2 was clarified in Joiner. The
Court in Joiner reemphasized the importance of the trial judge's
role as gatekeeper.
66. Id. at 533.
67. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 516.
68. Id. at 518.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 519 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595
(1993)).
71. Id.
72. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 597.
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Presently, there are bills pending in Congress that propose
amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 relating to the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence.73 These proposals would add a
presumption of inadmissibility of such evidence, and, incidentally,
would disqualify an expert witness whose compensation is contin-
gent on the outcome of the case, a most salutary suggestion.
Critics, like Judge Ralph K. Winter of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, complain that the bills do not accurately codify
the decision in Daubert.4 Another commentator remarked that
the amendment would improperly take away the jury's responsi-
bility to decide right and wrong, scientific truth and scientific fal-
sity, and gives it "to a handful of government officials appointed
for life."'75 This critic further observed that the attempted codifica-
tion, captioned, felicitously, the "Honesty in Evidence Act," would
"be a wonderful lawyers' full employment act for lawyers paid by
the hour who will litigate for the next ten years over whether or not
Congress was codifying the Daubert opinion. ' 76  One supporter
praises the bill for ensuring "that the science that jurors and judges
hear in a courtroom is not inferior to the science that scientists and
researchers hear at their professional meetings. ' 77 He also notes
that it is unlikely that the average juror will comprehend weak-
nesses in expert testimony brought out during cross examination.78
73. See Crime Prevention Act of 1997, S. 488, 105th Cong. § 203 (1997); Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act, H.R. 903, 105th Cong.
§ 4 (1997); Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1997, S. 79, 105th Cong. § 302 (1997).
74. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 79., 105th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 10,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 102 of H.R. 10, entitled Honesty in Evidence provides in
pertinent part:
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is amended ... by adding at the
end the following: (b) Adequate basis for opinion. Testimony in the form of
an opinion by a witness that is based on scientific knowledge shall be inad-
missible in evidence unless the court determines that such opinion is - (1)
based on scientifically valid reasoning; and (2) sufficiently reliable so that the
probative value of such evidence outweighs the dangers specified in rule 403.
(c) Disqualification. Testimony by a witness who is qualified as described in
subsection (a) is inadmissible in evidence if such witness is entitled to receive
any compensation contingent on the legal deposition of any claim with re-
spect to which such testimony is offered.
75. See Attorney Accountability: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives, 1 04 h Cong. 146, 160 (1995) (statement of Anthony Z. Roisman).
76. Id.
77. See Attorney Accountability Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 104
" Cong. 146, 155, 159 (1995) (statement of Robert Charrow).
78. See id.
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This review of the law under Daubert, and most recently Joiner,
is certainly not intended to be exhaustive, but is meant to highlight
the types of questions that courts continue to face when confronted
with proffers of expert testimony. This analysis is also to dispel any
notion that Daubert really did decide the junk science debate.
III. The Lawyer's Role
It is abundantly clear that lawyers cannot hide behind the guise
of Daubert and contend that there is no need for further thought or
debate about the proper use and role of junk science in our court-
rooms. Instead, I suggest that it is time for lawyers to confront
their own obligations in bringing this "expert" testimony to the
courts in the first place.
We have discussed the role of the expert, the jury, the judge; but
what is, or what should be, the lawyer's role? Daubert may provide
some guidance as to what expert testimony will or will not be ac-
cepted by courts, but it surely does not provide all the answers.
Consider the following example, the facts of which are taken from
an actual case in the Sixth Circuit. Plaintiff alleged that use of the
drug Ritodrine caused plaintiff's cardiomyopathy. 9  One year
before trial, plaintiff's only causation expert opined that it was
"least likely and least provable from a scientific standpoint" that
the cardiomyopathy was caused by use of Ritodrine.80 On the eve
of his testimony, however, the same expert informed plaintiff's
counsel that he had "moved up" his hypothesis to a more likely
explanation based on subsequently discovered literature. The ex-
pert informed the lawyer that he was now prepared to testify that
Ritodrine had a direct toxic effect on the plaintiff's heart
condition. 81
Should plaintiff's lawyer have proceeded with the case knowing,
up until the eve of testimony, that his own "expert" believed that it
was "least likely and least provable" that the drug caused the heart
ailments? If so, how should the lawyer have proceeded when the
expert suddenly changed his opinion? It turned out, in this (pre-
Daubert) case, that the district court and the Sixth Circuit rejected
defendant's claim that the expert's testimony was "junk science"
and, surprisingly, allowed the testimony.82 This sort of result only
79. See Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prod., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993) cert. denied
sub nom., 510 U.S. 914, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993).
80. Id. at 540.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 533-34.
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compounds the lawyer's dilemma: should he, as a zealous advocate,
simply try to introduce any evidence that would advance his cli-
ent's claims? In short, what, if any, obligation does the lawyer have
to scrutinize the expert testimony he seeks to admit?
It is clear that the lawyer does have a duty to determine whether
he believes expert testimony will be admissible before trying to in-
troduce such evidence in court.8 3 This duty arises both out of the
lawyer's ethical obligation to represent a client zealously and his
obligation to represent a client within the bounds of the law. 4 To
be an effective advocate, the lawyer must vigorously prepare for
the presentation of facts and law and, in doing so, needs to test the
accuracy and reliability of any testimony, including expert testi-
mony, he wishes to introduce. At the same time, as an officer of
the court, the lawyer has a duty to the adversarial system of justice
not to introduce frivolous or unreliable expert testimony.
As the Model Code of Professional Responsibility declares,
the advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of
facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with
an open and neutral mind and to render impartial judgments.
The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system
are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds
of the law.
The partisan striving of an advocate is not compromised by a law-
yer's duty of complete candor and loyalty to the legal system. The
Supreme Court of the State of Washington recognized this notion
in stating: "Vigorous advocacy is not contingent on lawyers being
free to pursue litigation tactics that they cannot justify as legiti-
mate. The lawyer's duty to place his client's interests ahead of all
others presupposes that the lawyer will live with the rules that gov-
ern the system."'8 6 Essentially, under this court's analysis, a law-
yer's duty to scrutinize (and perhaps withhold) his own expert's
testimony goes hand-in-hand with other obligations the lawyer
owes to his client.
In this light, my thesis - that a lawyer has an ethical duty not to
introduce junk science - may not seem so controversial. Ethical
issues arise with regard to all strategic decisions made by the advo-
cate in preparing a case for trial, and in conducting a trial. Charles
83. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1981).
84. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1981).
85. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1981).
86. Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054,
1084 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
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Wolfram notes in his treatise on legal ethics that "an assumption
that underlies the adversarial system is that the mutually conten-
tious strivings of relatively equal advocates will make truth and jus-
tice apparent to the judge and, if different, the fact finder."87
But the lawyer's ethical duty is immeasurably more complex
when scientific expert testimony is at issue. The ethical rules rec-
ognize that the law is ambiguous, but require that a lawyer must
insure there is a good faith basis for the admissibility of evidence
prior to introducing such evidence.88 When scientific evidence is at
issue, the lawyer himself must first gain a comprehensive under-
standing of technical scientific data and methodology in order to
make this determination in good faith. The Supreme Court ob-
served in Daubert that, the law must "resolve disputes finally and
quickly," while "scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revi-
sion. '"89 Science is also, as the Supreme Court recognized, fur-
thered by "broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of
hypotheses." 90 Such conjectures, which are a part of the scientific
process, are of little use to a lawyer who needs to reach a relatively
quick, final decision regarding admissibility.91 In the face of this
uncertainty, a lawyer must decide, before he seeks to introduce sci-
entific testimony into evidence, that there is a good faith basis to
believe that evidence is reliable scientific evidence.
The Daubert standards do not make this job any easier. District
and circuit courts have had trouble applying the Supreme Court's
standards or "general observations" in determining what is valid,
reliable scientific knowledge. 92 The decision in Joiner has clarified
some of the ambiguities in Daubert, but it leaves the question of
admissibility up to each trial judge's discretion. This will likely lead
to varying standards of admissibility. As yet, there is certainly no
consensus among the courts as to what scientific testimony should
pass muster under Daubert. Even the Supreme Court in Daubert
admitted that, under the standard it established for admissibility,
"shaky" scientific evidence could still be admissible.93
87. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1986).
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.1 (1983).
89. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
90. Id.
91. See id. But see In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960 (E.D.N.Y.,
S.D.N.Y. 1996), wherein Judge Weinstein has decided to allow plaintiffs' claims to
stay alive rather than "rush to judgment," despite the lack of scientific support, be-
cause plaintiffs' scientific evidence "may have the scintilla of plausibility that merits
reservation of judgement while evaluation goes forward."
92. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
93. See id. at 596.
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IV. The Lawyer's Obligations to the Client
Lawyers, therefore, have no clear guidelines on what will, or will
not, be deemed admissible scientific expert testimony. If the courts
set no clear standards, how, then, should a lawyer define "junk sci-
ence"? If Daubert acknowledges that "shaky" evidence may be ad-
missible, does this mean that an attorney may, under the good faith
standard embodied in the ethical rules, introduce "shaky" scientific
evidence? How much time must the lawyer spend in determining
whether the evidence constitutes junk science, and who is to be
billed for this time?
Judges have acknowledged the daunting task they behold in de-
ciding the admissibility of expert testimony. One judge bluntly
stated:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court's opinion [in Daubert], is to resolve disputes among
respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely
within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific con-
sensus as to what is and what is not 'good science,' and occasion-
ally to reject such expert testimony because it was not 'derived
by the scientific method.' ' 9
4
Finally, if, as noted above, the federal courts are applying
Daubert differently, it is certain that individual attorneys will also
have different interpretations of what constitutes junk science.
Will an ethical lawyer who goes up against a less scrupulous advo-
cate be at a disadvantage? 95 If lawyers now undertake the task of
screening out junk science, will their clients be deprived of a level
playing field? In today's competitive legal market, will lawyers
hold fast to their ethical obligations at the risk of losing business? 96
Clients should not be underestimated regarding their responsive-
ness to advice with respect to the long-term costs a particular legal
tactic may produce. A relevant ethical obligation of the attorney is
to:
exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his clients are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant consid-
erations .... In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is
often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may
94. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
95. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 84 (1994).
96. See id.
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lead to a decision that is morally just. as well as legally
permissible.97
The report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility
remarked, in 1958, that:
[tihe most effective realization of the law's aims often takes
place in the attorney's office .... Contrary to popular belief, the
compliance with the law thus brought about is not generally lip-
serving and narrow, for by reminding him of its long-run costs
the lawyer often deters his client from a course of conduct tech-
nically permissible under existing law, though inconsistent with
its underlying spirit and purpose.9"
It has often been noted that a lawyer's role as advisor to the
client is equally important as his role as advocate. The lawyer's
ethical obligation would require him or her to counsel the client
regarding the dangers of offering junk science into evidence, and
the long term costs of such a tactic both to the client's case and to
the legal system.
One retort to the proposition that a lawyer has an ethical obliga-
tion to refrain from introducing junk science is that the adversary
system is designed to weed out unreliable evidence. As noted, the
Supreme Court reiterated this observation in Daubert, in stating
that "[v]igorous cross examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-
tional and appropriate means" of preventing the consideration of
junk science.99 Aren't motions in limine, objections, and cross-ex-
amination sufficient to protect the court process from junk science?
Why should the lawyer advocating the position have to do his ad-
versary's job by refraining from introducing evidence which is
questionably reliable? Similar questions have been raised by Judge
Sam Pointer, who has been charged with supervising the thousands
of nationwide silicone breast implant lawsuits. In remarking on the
judge's role as gatekeeper, Judge Pointer commented that, in the
absence of a sufficiently strong basis or argument by an objecting
party to the expert's opinion, trial judges should not be required to
97. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 144-45 (1993).
98. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1161 (1958).
99. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
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automatically resolve issues regarding the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 100
There are certain problems with this argument in the context of a
lawyer's obligations. One major problem with relying on the pro-
tections of the adversary system is that many times discussions take
place during settlement negotiations, where the natural boundaries
of the adversary system are not present. Lawyers can gain bargain-
ing power by threatening to introduce junk science through quali-
fied expert testimony. Take the example of the breast implant
litigation. Dow Corning, the breast implant maker, agreed to a
$4.25 billion class action settlement in 1994 (including $1 billion
earmarked for lawyers) and filed for bankruptcy a year later. The
manufacturer agreed to these concessions even though there had
been no scientific evidence showing a causal connection between
immune system disorder and silicone gel implants. 10' Some say
that the settlement has fallen apart, however, because Dow Corn-
ing has been winning lawsuits in the wake of the Daubert deci-
sion."' If such is so, in the settlement context, the adversary
system is not sufficient to protect against the consideration of junk
science. A lawyer's adherence to his ethical obligations, however,
would help to prevent junk science from being improperly used as
a sword in settlement negotiations.
Another issue to consider is whether the lawyer, as a gatekeeper
of sorts, can help to prevent junk science from pervading our court-
rooms. And here we are not talking just about claims bottomed on
theories of astrology, numerology, or phrenology. Assume you are
faced with a highly qualified expert with excellent credentials who
is willing to testify in support of the proposition you are advocat-
ing. In your investigation, you discover that the vast weight of au-
thority runs contrary to your expert's testimony. You have a good
faith basis to believe it could be admissible, however, based on the
expert's qualifications. Do your ethical obligations require you to
refrain from introducing this evidence? At least one ethics expert
has said "no." Professor Geoffrey Hazard has opined that, even if
an attorney is aware that an expert's views are not respected by his
100. See FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEWS, supra note 46, at 4.
101. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 57-61, 99-103, 195-96.
102. See Paul Reidinger, They Blinded Me with Science!, 82 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at
54, 60; see also Paul Connors, Science on Trial. The Clash of Medical Evidence and the
Law in the Breast Implant Case, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 251, 354 (1997) (reviewing An-
gell's Science on Trial).
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or her colleagues in the field, hiring such an expert is not
unethical.10 3
Taking this hypothetical case further, assume that the evidence is
admitted and you win the case. What if you later discover that the
"scientific expert" whose testimony you introduced was actually a
charlatan who testified to nothing more than junk science? Just as
a criminal defense lawyer who learns after a trial that his client lied
on the stand must report the perjury to the tribunal, a lawyer who
later discovers his expert was a quack should report this informa-
tion to the court.1 0 4 The disciplinary rules require that a lawyer
promptly disclose instances where "[a] person other than the [law-
yer's] client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal."1 5
In this hypothetical case, an attorney's ethical obligations would
not be enough to prevent the admission of junk science. If, in addi-
tion to acting as gatekeeper, an attorney were to be held accounta-
ble for introducing evidence that later turns out to be junk science,
attorneys would be less likely to risk the introduction of junk sci-
ence. To the extent that it is discovered before the conclusion of
proceedings that certain evidence presented was, in fact, junk sci-
ence, the offering attorney could be sanctioned pursuant to Rule
11.106 In this regard, one observer goes so far as to suggest that
"[i]f the individual scientist in fact presents views that have not
103. See David Bernstein, Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire. The Expert Wit-
ness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117, 122-23 n.34 (1990).
104. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(6) (1981) (in his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not "participate in the creation or preserva-
tion of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false"); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3 (1983). See also, WOLFRAM, supra note 87, at
657-60.
105. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(2)(1996).
106. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or un-
represented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, -. . .(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evi-
dentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Rule 11 only applies:
to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court. It does
not cover matters arising for the first time during oral presentations to the
court, when counsel may make statements that would not have been made if
there had been more time for study and reflection. However, a litigant's
obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured
solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
been derived, shared or checked by other scientists, there is a sub-
tle but serious problem of misrepresentation.""0 7 There are bills
pending in Congress pushing amendments to Rule 11, proposing
that its sanctions be made mandatory. 108
V. Solutions
Are there other alternatives? Judge Hand, who as you may re-
call had great distrust about the jury's ability to sort through com-
plex and conflicting expert testimony,10 9 proposed that a court-
appointed board of experts or advisory tribunal hear the expert
evidence and then advise the jury. 10 A similar suggestion is made
by Dr. Marcia Angell, a non-lawyer and the author of the book
Science on Trial,"' which discusses the clash of medical evidence
and the law in the breast implant case. Judge Pointer, as part of his
supervision of the breast implant suits, has recently followed Judge
Hand's advice and has convened a panel of four independent ex-
perts to evaluate the current evidence regarding the causal connec-
tion between silicone and immune system disorder.1 2 In so doing,
Judge Pointer is seen as "turning over science decisions to the
scientists."' 1 3 Is he providing an easy out for attorneys, or does his
answer just beg the question as to the lawyer's own ethical
obligations?
Justice Stephen Breyer, in his concurring opinion in Joiner,
makes the case for this approach, citing Federal Rule of Evidence
706 and the availability of expert assistance from organizations
such as the National Academy of Sciences and the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science.
Given the current state of the law, there may be no pat answer
for today's litigators. It is no longer sufficient to cite the advice of
that great New York lawyer, Elihu Root, who once opined: About
reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those plead-
ings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit.
Id. at Rule 11 (advisory committee notes). In the case of junk science, it is arguable
that Rule 11 is violated by an attorney who files a complaint which is based entirely
on junk science.
107. Peter W. Huber and Kenneth R. Foster, 33 Science in the Courts Civil Justice
Memo (Center for Judicial Studies, The Manhattan Inst.) Sept. 1997, at 7.
108. See e.g., S. 400, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); S. 79, 10 5th Cong. (1997).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
110. See Hand, supra note 19, at 56-58.
111. See supra note 7.
112. See Thomas M. Burton, Top Judge in Breast-Implant Case Calls on Doctors to
Hear Evidence, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1997, at B6.
113. Id.
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half of the practice of the decent lawyer consists in telling would-be
clients that they are damned fools and should stop." 4 The rush of
science and technology and post-Daubert confusion in the courts
have robbed this admonition of much of its worth when it comes to
claims based on scientific evidence.
I am bold to suggest, however, that there is a workable tripartite
framework within which to approach the dilemma of the attorney
in dealing with his obligations to the court and to his client in such
cases. First, is the full recognition of the lawyer's professional obli-
gation to carefully scrutinize the integrity of his own expert's pro-
posed testimony within the limits of his capacity and resources?
Second, is the concern legitimate that his opponent will perform a
similar examination of the proposed evidence, keeping in mind the
availability of Rule 11 sanctions as an inducement to oblige that he
present only bona fide expert scientific theories in his case? Fi-
nally, as a cap to this process, the court should always reserve the
right to refer disputes over alleged "junk science" to an independ-
ent panel of experts, not to decide the question in controversy, but
to assess the quality of the expertise as required under the
"gatekeeping" regimen of Daubert.
My own view, I must admit, is more tilted toward the solutions
put forward by Judge Hand and Dr. Angell, but I recognize the
commitment, long a part of our jurisprudence, to the sanctity of the
jury, not the expert, as the ultimate finder of fact. This task is not
eased by the following notation by the Supreme Court in Daubert:
"There are important differences between the quest for truth in the
courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific con-
clusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand,
must resolve disputes finally and quickly.' 1 5
What is required, I suggest, to best fulfill this task is that lawyers
from both sides of a particular case, the judge and the experts, be-
gin to take their obligations to juries and to the legal system, within
which they all operate, much more seriously. In an era of vast and
rapid scientific and technological advances, this is a necessary bur-
den to be borne by all involved in advancing and preserving the
rule of law.
114. PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 1845-1909 133 (1938).
115. Daubert, supra note 89.
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